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Abstract Clinical teams are of growing importance to healthcare delivery, but little is
known about how teams learn and change their clinical practice. We examined how teams
in three US hospitals succeeded in making signiﬁcant practice improvements in the area of
antimicrobial resistance. This was a qualitative cross-case study employing Soft Knowl-
edge Systems as a conceptual framework. The purpose was to describe how teams pro-
duced, obtained, and used knowledge and information to bring about successful change. A
purposeful sampling strategy was used to maximize variation between cases. Data were
collected through interviews, archival document review, and direct observation. Individual
case data were analyzed through a two-phase coding process followed by the cross-case
analysis. Project teams varied in size and were multidisciplinary. Each project had more
than one champion, only some of whom were physicians. Team members obtained relevant
knowledge and information from multiple sources including the scientiﬁc literature,
experts, external organizations, and their own experience. The success of these projects
hinged on the teams’ ability to blend scientiﬁc evidence, practical knowledge, and clinical
data. Practice change was a longitudinal, iterative learning process during which teams
continued to acquire, produce, and synthesize relevant knowledge and information and test
different strategies until they found a workable solution to their problem. This study adds
to our understanding of how teams learn and change, showing that innovation can take the
form of an iterative, ongoing process in which bits of K&I are assembled from multiple
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DOI 10.1007/s10459-009-9214-ysources into potential solutions that are then tested. It suggests that existing approaches to
assessing the impact of continuing education activities may overlook signiﬁcant contri-
butions and more attention should be given to the role that practical knowledge plays in the
change process in addition to scientiﬁc knowledge.
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Effective practice utilizes different forms of knowledge. Understanding professional
practice requires an awareness of the ways in which knowledge informs practice and
is developed from practice.
—Joy Higgs and Angie Titchen in Practice, Knowledge and Expertise in the Health
Professions (Higgs and Titchen 2001,p .5 )
Background/problem
As a ﬁeld, continuing medical education has been called to move beyond dissemination of
information and reorient its activities around improving clinical practice. One important
reason is the well-documented gap between evidence-based practices and current clinical
practice (Davis 2006; McGlynn et al. 2003). In this study we examined three instances in
which healthcare teams found ways to successfully traverse the gap. Our purpose was to
describe how groups in the hospital setting, hereafter called project teams, produced,
obtained, and used knowledge and information (K&I) to bring about successful change in
their practices related to a speciﬁc clinical area: reducing antimicrobial resistance.
The KT perspective on practice change
Knowledge translation (KT) has emerged as a potential response to closing the gap
between actual and desired practices (Straus and Mazmanian 2006). Although there is no
agreed-upon deﬁnition of KT, it is usually concerned with how the results of scientiﬁc
inquiry can be employed to improve clinical practice and patient outcomes (Davis 2006;
Estabrook et al. 2006; Graham et al. 2006). This view of practice change is built on the
assumption that formal scientiﬁc knowledge is the most (if not only) relevant form of
knowledge, that knowledge can be directly transmitted from one actor to another, and
clinicians are users but not producers of relevant knowledge. Some of the limitations of
this perspective have recently been acknowledged (Davies et al. 2008; McWilliam 2007).
An in-depth critique of prevailing views of KT is beyond the scope of this paper;
however, we want to note that, drawing on the work of Scho ¨n( 1983), Wenger (1998),
Huberman (1994), and Brown and Duguid (2002), we grounded our study on three main
assumptions: there are multiple ways of producing knowledge; health care providers are
both consumers and producers of knowledge and information in the change process; and
knowledge is not a commodity that can be detached from the knower. These assumptions
transform the way we conceptualize the nature and role of continuing education for health
care professionals and modify our expectations of its impact on professional practice. Seen
from this perspective, practitioners no longer appear as ‘‘empty vessels waiting to be ﬁlled
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123with the wisdom of research. Like the researchers, they have a coherent cognitive structure
against which new information is actively tested’’ (Huberman 1994, p. 28). They become
active, knowing agents who conduct their own ‘‘experiments,’’ develop hypotheses, act on
the world, and observe the results (see, for example, Kolb and Fry 1975; Scho ¨n 1983). In
short, it shifts our view away from professionals as consumers of scientiﬁc knowledge
toward professionals as active, knowing agents whose learning is intimately bound up with
their daily practice and practical experience.
A focus on teams
To the extent that CME is concerned to improve clinical practice, it cannot focus solely on
individual physician learning, but must instead address the physician in a larger context.
Although the practice environment is complex and multidimensional (Cabana et al. 1999;
Eve et al. 1996; Grol 2001), we focused on clinical teams as a key variable. Borrowing
from Guzzo and Dickson (1996, pp. 308–309), we deﬁne team as ‘‘individuals who see
themselves and who are seen by others as a social entity, who are interdependent because
of the tasks they perform as members of a group, who are embedded in one or more larger
social systems (e.g., community, organization), and who perform tasks that affect others
(such as customers or coworkers).’’
There are several reasons to place clinical teams at the center of our thinking about
improving practice. First, care is increasingly being provided in teams (Boaden and Lea-
viss 2000; Institute of Medicine 2001), a trend that is almost a necessary outcome of the
rate of change in medical knowledge and the increasing specialization of health care
professionals (Edmondson 2006). As a result, changes in clinical practice can rarely be
accomplished by a single individual (Smith and Schmitz 2004). Second, the quality of
health care is highly dependent upon the collective practice of teams (Donaldson and Mohr
2000; Salas et al. 2008). It has been documented that up to 80% of medical errors are
related to interactions within the health care team (Schaefer et al. 1994). Finally, most
previous studies of physician learning and change have taken the physician as the unit of
analysis and given us insight into how individual physicians successfully learn and change
(Fox et al. 1989; Geertsma et al. 1982; Slotnick 1999). Much less attention has been given
to looking at change through the group-level lens, despite the promise it has shown in
organization studies (Edmondson et al. 2001).
Team learning
The current study is located at the intersection of the constructs of team, learning, and
clinical practice. We deﬁne team learning using an adaptation of the deﬁnition offered by
Sole and Edmonson (2002) as the acquisition, production, and application of knowledge
and information that enables members of a team to collectively address team tasks and
issues for which solutions were not previously obvious. We also posit a direct link between
team learning and clinical practice change, embracing Fiol and Lyles’s (1985) view that
evidence of team learning can be found when teams have changed their work practices to
reﬂect new knowledge and information.
There is a growing literature on team learning, much of which is written from an
organization perspective (see, for example, Argote 1999; Argote et al. 2001) that has
focused on how groups establish themselves, how they do their work, and the processes by
which groups change themselves (Argote et al. 2001). Few studies have examined how
teams change their practice in a naturalistic setting (Guzzo and Dickson 1996) but they do
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123show a signiﬁcant potential for adaptive learning and change at the level of the team across
several professional domains (Brown and Duguid 1991; Horbar et al. 2001; Hutchins 1991;
Weick and Roberts 1993).
In the health care ﬁeld, there is evidence to suggest that the collective learning process
at the team level can be a critical component of successful practice change (Edmondson
et al. 2001). Factors shown to promote successful learning and change are (a) a high level
of scientiﬁc evidence supporting the recommended practice changes (Dopson and Fitz-
gerald 2005; Tucker et al. 2007), (b) a psychologically safe team environment (Edmondson
2003; Tucker et al. 2007), (c) rich social linkages between teams and relevant actors in
their community of practice (Dopson and Fitzgerald 2005; Edmondson 2003) and (d)
experience in three areas: the team’s level of experience using the new practices, the
team’s level of experience working together as a team, and the length of time team
members have been in the health care organization (Dopson and Fitzgerald 2005; Reagans
et al. 2005).
Our deﬁnition of team learning makes the acquisition and use of knowledge and
information central to the process of successful practice change. However this dimension
of team learning has not been explored, leaving unanswered some key questions: How do
teams of healthcare professionals acquire and use knowledge and information to improve
their practice? What roles do various forms of knowledge play? The current study is
intended as an investigation into these questions.
Methods
This study was part of a larger initiative: the Antimicrobial Resistance Educational Alli-
ance (AREA), a nationwide collaborative in the US that sought to provide continuing
education to health care providers in 2006–2007 (www.areainitiatives.org) and encourage
adoption of the Centers for Disease Control’s 12 Step Program for Reducing Antimicrobial
Resistance in Hospitalized Adults (Brinsley et al. 2005). The key components of the CDC’s
program are summarized in Table 1. As noted earlier, the purpose of this research was to
describe how project teams in the hospital setting produced, obtained, and used knowledge
and information (K&I) to bring about successful change in their practices related to
reducing antimicrobial resistance. To achieve this purpose we focused on three key
questions:
1. How did actors organize themselves to achieve change?
2. What knowledge and information did actors use?
3. From what sources did they obtain relevant K&I and how did they obtain it?
We used Soft Knowledge Systems (SKS) theory (Engel 1997) as a conceptual frame-
work (Table 2) to formulate research questions, inform development of the interview
questions, and conduct the ﬁrst level of data analysis. An underlying assumption of SKS is
that knowledge and information are central to innovation, which is the term Engel uses for
any purposeful change in practice.
1 Individuals and organizations both use and create
knowledge and information to solve problems, adapt to changes in the environment, and
enact goals. SKS was chosen because it was developed explicitly to explore ways to
facilitate innovation; gives a central role to knowledge, information, and networks (and
hence to learning and education) in the innovation process; and recognizes multiple forms
1 Hereafter we use the terms innovation and practice change interchangeably.
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123of knowledge making actors involved in innovating both ‘source’ and ‘users’ of knowledge
and information. Although it was developed to understand and facilitate innovation in
agriculture, Engel has demonstrated its applicability to other ﬁelds (Ro ¨ling and Engel
1990) and we believe it brings a valuable perspective to the health care ﬁeld as well.
This was a qualitative comparative case study. The aim was not to generalize to a larger
population but to come to an in-depth understanding of selected instances of successful
innovation. We empirically examined hospitals in the US that demonstrated success in
implementing at least one component of the CDC’s 12 Steps for Reducing Antimicrobial
Resistance in Hospitalized Adults. Success was deﬁned as change in practice leading to a
subsequent improvement in a clinical outcome. We used a purposeful sampling strategy
(Patton 1980), seeking to maximize variation between cases.
Sites were nominated by experts in the ﬁeld and screened by the research team in a
preliminary telephone contact. Screening criteria required that the project addressed one or
more clinical issues addressed by the CDC’s 12 Step initiative, used pre- and post-out-
comes measures, involved one or more physicians, was completed within the past 2 years,
and took place in the absence of extraordinary circumstances (e.g., signiﬁcant grant
funding). Cases meeting our criteria were asked to provide an abstract describing the
project, which was then sent to a panel of three nationally-recognized experts in antimi-
crobial resistance—an infectious disease specialist, infection control specialist, and phar-
macist—for validation as an instance of a successful project. Using a rating form, experts
were asked to determine using a ﬁve-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘‘criterion not
met’’ to ‘‘criterion fully met’’ if the project addressed an important health care problem,
made a signiﬁcant contribution to the overall goal of reducing antimicrobial resistance,
used outcome measures that were appropriate given the goals of the project, measured
improvement in patient/clinical outcomes, and demonstrated signiﬁcant improvement in
outcome measures. They were also asked whether they would consider the project to be an
Table 1 CDC 12-steps to prevent antimicrobial resistance in the hospitalized setting
Strategy: prevent infection
Step 1: Vaccinate
Step 2: Get the catheters out
Strategy: diagnose and treat infection effectively
Step 3: Target the pathogen
Step 4: Access the experts
Strategy: use antimicrobials wisely
Step 5: Practice antimicrobial control
Step 6: Use local data
Step 7: Treat infection, not contamination
Step 8: Treat infection, not colonization
Step 9: Know when to say ‘‘no’’ to vanco
Step 10: Stop treatment when infection is cured or unlikely
Strategy: prevent transmission
Step 11: Isolate the pathogen
Step 12: Break the chain of contagion
The CDC campaign to prevent antimicrobial resistance in healthcare settings. Available at:
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/healthcare. Accessed May 25, 2009
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123example of a successful initiative to reduce nosocomial infection (or as appropriate,
antimicrobial resistance) using a binary yes-no scale.
Table 3 summarizes characteristics of the cases. Case 1, an academic medical center in
the western US addressed a marked increase in resistance in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
through the implementation of a hospital-wide policy restricting use of selected antimi-
crobials. Case 2 centered around an intensive care unit in a medium-sized community
hospital in the Midwest. The goal was to eliminate ventilator-associated pneumonias
(VAP) using a variety of strategies including implementation of a modiﬁed version of the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s VAP bundle.
2 Finally in Case 3, a small com-
munity hospital on the Atlantic coast sought to reduce the number of new hospital-acquired
methicillin-resistant Staphlococcus aureus (MRSA) infections. To achieve this goal, the
hospital implemented surveillance screening of patients on admission, isolation proce-
dures, and a strict hand hygiene policy. The outcomes of these successful efforts at change
are also described in Table 3.
Table 2 Key concepts from soft knowledge systems theory
Concept Deﬁnition
Innovation ‘‘‘Change-on-purpose’, propelled by individual and collective intentions’’ (Engel
1997, p. 11). Encompasses both the decision to make a change in practice and
implementation
Knowledge ‘‘Knowledge is taken very broadly to mean the concepts, ideas, insights and routines
(including mental routines) people use to impute meaning to events and ideas’’
(Engel 1997, p. 32). A property of individuals, it cannot be observed or
communicated directly, instead it is embodied in individual and social actions
Information ‘‘A pattern imposed on a carrier such as sound, radio waves, paper, diskettes, electronic
cables and so forth’’ (Engel 1997, p. 32). Information is explicit and can contribute to
the development of knowledge
Knowledge
network
‘‘The more or less formalized, relatively stable pattern of communication and
interaction among social actors who share a common concern [such as improving
clinical practice] … Such patterns emerge as a result of relation-building efforts
among actors’’ (Engel 1997, p. 37). These networks may be found within
organizations or extend across organizations and institutions; they ‘‘may be
spontaneous and totally informal, or designed to serve a speciﬁc purpose’’ (Engel
1997, p. 37). Knowledge networks can be described only in relation to some purpose.
Innovation is the desired outcome of a knowledge network, but in practice they are
deﬁned in relation to more speciﬁc goals
Actor Individuals or collectivities involved directly or indirectly in an innovation. May be
either internal or external to the innovating group or organization
Communication
linkage
The formal or informal channels or networks through which information ﬂows.
Communication is ‘‘the production, exchange and processing of information
(including symbolic information) between two or more social actors’’ (Engel 1997,
p. 33)
Knowledge
processes
A concept used to anticipate and identify the activities and division of labor among
actors within a knowledge network. We employed Ro ¨ling and Engel’s (1991)
approach of looking at the generation, acquisition, integration, distribution
and utilization of knowledge and information
2 The IHI VAP Bundle included elevation of head of the bed to 45 , daily sedation vacations and
assessment of readiness to extubate, peptic ulcer disease prophylaxis, and deep venous thrombosis pro-
phylaxis. The head of bed guideline was adjusted by the project team to 30  due to problems they
encountered with the steeper angle.
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123Informants in each case were selected on the basis of other informants’ descriptions of
who was involved in the project. The initial contact person, themselves a key actor, was
asked to provide a preliminary list of individuals involved in the project. We interviewed
all persons on that list. From these interviews we learned of additional actors who would
then be contacted, a ‘snowball’ approach to sampling (Patton 1990). In the case of col-
lective actors (e.g., a committee or ICU nurses), we requested the names of individuals
who were part of that collective and could provide a representative perspective.
Five trained ﬁeld researchers collected data through semi-structured interviews, docu-
ment review, and direct observation. Interviews were conducted on-site or by telephone
and were transcribed verbatim. Data were analyzed using NVivo software. At the indi-
vidual case level, primary coding was done using a coding dictionary. Secondary coding
focused on emergent themes.
The unit of analysis for this study was the knowledge network speciﬁc to each case. As
deﬁned by Engel (1997), a knowledge network is ‘‘the more or less formalized, relatively
stable pattern of communication and interaction among social actors who share a common
concern’’ (p. 37). We constructed diagrams of the knowledge network for each case
showing the individual and collective actors relevant to the case and the communication
linkages between them. From a Soft Knowledge Systems perspective, knowledge network
diagrams are not considered models of a real, independently existing world; instead they
are constructs developed to facilitate inquiry and discussion. Ultimately, the research team
had to determine how the network diagram was constructed through a process of data and
researcher triangulation. We examined and compared the accounts of our informants and
information from archival documents to construct each diagram. Any differences among
research team members were discussed and resolved.
Cross case analysis followed completion of the individual case analyses and employed a
modiﬁcation of Stake’s (2006) protocol. To enhance the trustworthiness of our ﬁndings, we
Table 3 Case characteristics
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Location West Midwest East
Pseudonym Western University
Hospital
Trinity Hospital Atlantic Community
Hospital
Size Large Midsize Small
Type Academic Community Community
Interviewees 13 18 18
General focus Antibiotic Mgmt Infection control Antibiotic Mgmt and
infection control
Speciﬁc clinical
focus
Pseudomonas
aeruginosa
resistance
Ventilator-acquired
pneumonia
Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus
Intervention Fluoroquinolone
restriction policy
IHI VAP bundle, new
ET tube
Active surveillance cultures,
isolation, hand hygiene
Results Appropriate FQ use
went from 68 to
92%
6.0/1000 vent-days to
0.0 over 18 months
prior to study
Resistance went from 80 to
62%
Resistance from 49 to
39%
Hand hygiene compliance
rose from 45% to 89%
HA-MRSA virtually
eliminated
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123used data triangulation, investigator triangulation (Patton 1987), and member checks
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). The protocol for this study was approved by the University of
Wisconsin-Madison Health Sciences Institutional Review Board.
Results
Actor organization: the knowledge networks
Diagrams showing selected features of the knowledge network for each case are displayed
in Figs. 1, 2, and 3. The key actors, core project teams,
3 and external linkages are shown,
however, for clarity, we have omitted secondary (i.e., ‘non-key’) internal actors and the
linkages between all internal actors regardless of role.
The networks exhibit some similarities but also some major differences. In each case the
relevant knowledge network consisted of both individuals and collectives. Individual
actors included persons internal and external to the hospital in which the projects took
place. Collective actors included internal committees and external organizations. An
important collective actor in each case was the research community. Within this com-
munity we distinguished between researchers and the scientiﬁc literature produced by
researchers. This allowed us to differentiate between direct communication with persons
comprising this community and indirect communication through their published works.
The composition, conﬁguration and history of these knowledge networks varied across
cases. In Case 1, the network was relatively simple (Fig. 1). The core project team con-
sisted of two pharmacists and an infectious disease specialist who together comprised the
Antimicrobial Subcommittee of the hospital’s Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee. As
members of this standing subcommittee they had a history of working together on a variety
of projects, including previous attempts to solve their Pseudomonas resistance problem.
We considered them to be the core project team because of their critical role in deﬁning the
problem, developing hypotheses about its causes, constructing a potential solution to the
problem and providing leadership to its implementation. One important function of this
team was providing linkages to important K&I resources external to the hospital organi-
zation. They obtained relevant K&I, primarily in the form of scientiﬁc evidence, through
two processes: monitoring key journals in their ﬁeld and actively searching the scientiﬁc
literature to ﬁnd information that might be helpful.
The knowledge network for Case 2 is more complex (Fig. 2). The core project team was
larger and more interdisciplinary, consisting of a standing group, the ICU’s Respiratory
Clinical Action Team (RCAT) (which included a clinical nurse specialist, a lead respira-
tory therapist, and two staff nurses who volunteered to represent their peers), the ICU
medical director, and a newly-hired hospital infection control professional (ICP). The
network diagram shows that three individuals provided important linkages to external
resources. The ICP obtained information through existing relationships with the Centers
for Disease Control, a sister hospital (that also had a VAP project underway), the Asso-
ciation for Professionals in Infection Control & Epidemiology (APIC), and a nationally-
3 The project teams were somewhat ﬂuid in their makeup, with individuals moving in and out in response to
project requirements. To be considered a core project member, an individual had to be an active member
during most or all of the project term.
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123Fig. 2 Case 2: knowledge network showing linkages with external resources
Fig. 1 Case 1: knowledge network showing linkages with external resources
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123recognized infection control expert that she had met through her involvement in APIC. The
Respiratory Therapist drew on existing connections with the research community evi-
denced by regularly searching and reading journal articles, and ongoing discussions with
medical device sales representatives. She established a new linkage with an RT in the ICU
at a sister hospital. ICU clinical nurse specialist, the project leader, also provided key
linkages to the research community through journal searching and reading and through
participation in an Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) Breakthrough Collaborative
Program for ICU teams. The IHI program provided an important link to the research
community (e.g., by giving participants highly relevant, targeted journal articles) and the
practitioner community (e.g., by creating opportunities for teams from different hospitals
to share their knowledge and experience). The ICU Medical Director provided important
ties to the research community through journal reading and regular participation in sem-
inars and other activities offered by the medical professional societies of which he was a
member, as well as the IHI program.
The knowledge system for Case 3 (Fig. 3) was the most complex in terms of the number
of actors involved and linkages between actors, although the core project team was smaller,
consisting only of the ICP and an internist who chaired the Infection Control Committee.
The physician drew on several existing connections with key external resources. As a
regular reader of medical journals and attendee at seminars and other activities sponsored
by professional societies, he provided important linkages, direct and indirect, with the
research community. Also important were his existing relationships with colleagues at
other institutions, established through his involvement in professional society activities and
his experience as a resident physician. However, the ICP provided a bridge to a larger
number of external resources including the scientiﬁc literature, a regional program for
training infection control (IC) staff, a regional collaborative for reducing infection, the
regional APIC, the CDC, and key individuals associated with two of these organizations
(the IC training program and the regional collaborative).
Fig. 3 Case 3: knowledge network showing linkages with external resources
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123Multiple champions
There were several individuals identiﬁed as champions in each of the cases. As champions,
they demonstrated commitment to the endeavor, giving time and energy to the innovation,
and serving as advocates and messengers regarding the change. There was a high level of
agreement among our informants on who these champions were. All champions were
members of the project team; however, not all project team members were identiﬁed as
champions.
As the literature would predict, a physician champion was identiﬁed in each case (Ryan
et al. 2002). Although their role varied, they served as a liaison with other physicians in
order to obtain approval and advocate throughout the organization for the innovation, and
actively supported the implementation process (Tooman 2007). Interestingly, we observed
that while having a physician champion appeared to be a key component in the success of
each project, other healthcare professionals also served as champions and were viewed as
having a major inﬂuence on the success of the projects. Others who served as champions
were a pharmacist (Case 1), a clinical nurse specialist and respiratory therapist (Case 2),
and an infection control professional (Case 3).
Professional symmetry in relationships seemed to be an important reason for the
involvement of multiple champions, given their roles as messengers and change agents, as
the following quote suggests.
NURSE CHAMPION, CASE 2: So nursing knows how to talk nursing language.
Physicians talk physician language. Even though you could be well respected… I
think they tend to want to learn and hear from their peers. Just like I wouldn’t want
an aide or somebody else talking to me about nursing things.
Project teams
In each case there was an identiﬁable project team ranging in size from 2 to 6 members.
Table 4 lists by profession the members of the project team for each case. Composed of
individuals occupying mid-level positions in their organization, these teams were multi-
disciplinary work groups of key stakeholders in the innovation, cutting across organiza-
tional and professional boundaries to include persons considered to possess relevant
information or other resources needed for the project.
Table 4 Project team members Case Team member
1 Infectious disease physician
Infectious disease pharmacist
Infectious disease/critical care pharmacist
2 Clinical nurse specialist, critical care
Respiratory therapist
Infection control professional
Critical care nurse (1)
Critical care nurse (2)
Critical care physician and medical director
3 Infection control professional
Internal medicine physician
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critical to success. The following quote is illustrative:
INFECTIOUS DISEASE/CRITICAL CARE PHARMACIST, CASE 1: It really is a
team effort, and it really does have to be multidisciplinary, so you can’t be a bunch of
physicians forcing it down pharmacy or vice versa. I think what’s made our effort
fairly successful up to this point is just the fact that it has been multidisciplinary in
terms of pharmacists, physicians, nurses, everybody kind of working together, and
it’s not being driven just purely from the ID service.
Although the role and degree of autonomy (which we deﬁne as the ability to make
signiﬁcant decisions without the consent of others [Brock 2003]) the teams varied, they
were instrumental in identifying and framing the problem, generating a solution,
compiling relevant data to build their case, and reaching out to diverse groups of
stakeholders in order to get their buy-in. Teams also played a key role in implemen-
tation, providing leadership to individuals and groups charged with putting changes in
place.
The problem framing function of project teams was especially important in two cases.
In Case 1 the breakthrough came only after their high resistance rates were re-conceptu-
alized as a ﬂuoroquinolone overuse problem. In Case 2 the project team framed the VAP
problem as a performance shortfall, mainly on the part of the ICU nursing staff. Although it
focused on the negative and placed responsibility for any VAP cases squarely on the
shoulders of the ICU team, the net result appeared to be positive. Many of the actors in
Case 2 conveyed a strong sense of pride in their accomplishments, as exempliﬁed in the
following quote:
ICU NURSE EDUCATOR, CASE 2: I think it gave us a sense of empowerment. We
didn’t have to rely on any physician to direct the care that we gave to that patient. We
realized as nurses, we had the power and the ability to have an impact, and we didn’t
have to rely on an order from someone that says you have permission to raise the
head of the bed, or you must, a physician order that this is the way you’re going to
suction because suctioning practices and patient positioning and oral cares, those are
all things that are driven and guided by nurses. And we realize that, you know, we
have a lot of power to inﬂuence and impact, and I think it was empowering for us.
It was within project teams that much of the relevant information was shared and
transformed into workable knowledge. Potential solutions were conceptualized,
designed, reﬁned, tested, and then turned into standard operating procedures. They were
sites at which performance data were collected and reviewed. Teams were organized to
capitalize on general and local knowledge and information resources of their members.
These teams were the focal point in terms of obtaining, producing, sharing, organizing,
evaluating, adapting, and synthesizing knowledge, information, and data forging them
into a well-deﬁned set of practices adapted to their context and goals.
Knowledge and information used to innovate
We found that multiple forms of knowledge and information were used. To organize the
discussion that follows, we will address three types of K&I: scientiﬁc knowledge, practical
knowledge, and clinical data.
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123Scientiﬁc knowledge
Scientiﬁc knowledge played an integral role in these projects, although rarely were the
actors involved able to identify speciﬁc articles, study results, or practice guidelines that
they used; one notable exception was the use of the IHI VAP bundle in Case 2.
In each of the cases we studied, the scientiﬁc literature gave team members insight into
the underlying causes of problems the teams were working on. For example, in Case 1, a
key bit of information discovered in a peer-reviewed journal helped actors generate a new
hypothesis to explain why their Pseudomonas aeruginosa resistance rates might be rising,
suggesting a new strategy they might try and ultimately leading to a breakthrough.
ID PHARMACIST CHAMPION, CASE 1:… there was a lot of literature that was
coming out where ﬂuoroquinolones seemed to be prevalent in terms of resistance
rates going up. And we started looking at our own use, and it was the number one
antibiotic used in our hospital.
Having the scientiﬁc backing provided the credible evidence needed to persuade key
stakeholders that speciﬁc changes were required. The components of IHI’s VAP bundle
used in Case 2 were all based on Level 1 evidence (i.e., randomized controlled trials). The
IHI program provided the team with journal articles describing the evidence behind the
bundle and these materials were used by the team to facilitate acceptance of the proposed
changes.
INTERVIEWER: [W]ho was gathering the information, the journal articles?
NURSE CHAMPION, CASE 2: [IHI] gave us all the references… the nursing staff is
pretty happy just to know that if we have researched it, to take our word for it that
that’s the evidence. The physicians like to read it themselves, so if the physicians had
questions, we would provide them with copies of whatever they wanted.
Practical knowledge
Gleaned from the personal experience of the actors, practical knowledge played a prom-
inent role in each of the three cases and our data were rich with examples.
Prior to the start of the project in Case 2, the ICU project team had acquired valuable
experience making improvements in patient care in the unit. In their earlier attempts to
improve hand-washing and oral care they observed the impact of helping staff to ‘see’ the
value of the changes they were being asked to make. They did this by making ‘the invisible
visible,’ by ﬁrst making explicit the rationale behind the changes, the connections between
the change in practice and the desired patient outcome, and continuing to emphasize the
logical connections between the two so that staff could understand how the change was
supposed to contribute to the desired outcome. They also learned the value of continuous
monitoring and frequent dissemination of patient outcomes as a means of letting the staff
see for themselves the effects of the changes, motivating them to stick with it. Their earlier
efforts also gave them experience with various strategies for effectively communicating
with the staff when rolling out changes within the unit. They had used a number of
communication strategies including signs, in-service education, posters, bulletin boards
and vendor-led training sessions and they drew on this prior experience to develop their
roll-out plan for this next phase of their efforts to reduce VAP.
Another example of prior experience contributing in meaningful ways to the project can
be found in Case 1. One of the pharmacist champions drew on her residency training
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inﬂuence its success:
PHARMACIST CHAMPION, CASE 1: My residency training at [State University],
they had a pager that they restricted amphotericin products, the lipid pharmapho-
tericin products, mainly because of cost. And it was all pharmacist run, no physician
was involved. But I think they had a physician overseer, who, if they had any difﬁcult
people, the physician would intervene. So I kind of modeled part of this on that. I
wasn’t directly involved in that, because I was never, as a resident, allowed to carry
that pager, because it was an attending level, the pharmacist who carried it.
INTERVIEWER: But you had seen this work in another instance, in another setting?
PHARMACIST CHAMPION, CASE 1: Yeah. And again, with someone who has
tremendous rapport in a university with a lot of respect.
A noteworthy dimension of practical knowledge that emerged in each case was asso-
ciated with project team members’ length of experience in their organizations. Key actors
in each case cited the importance of long-standing relationships with others in the orga-
nization as one factor that contributed to the success of their project. Longevity gave actors
the opportunity to know others and be known to them. They described knowing who the
players were, how to work with them, who to trust, and also being known and respected by
the other players as someone who is competent and trustworthy. Many credited their strong
professional relationships throughout the organization and a climate of trust and respect as
a critical component of their success.
PHARMACIST CHAMPION, CASE 1: I believe a good reason why this worked in
our institution is that we are known entities. So… the three of us have been here for a
while… So, well-known to the department division heads, department heads,
whatever you want to call it. You know, basically, we aren’t a group of unknowns
coming in saying, ‘we need to do this.’ So, you know, rapport is so important… that
was key to this actually working.
The longevity of key actors also enabled them to gain practical knowledge speciﬁc to
their organization, or what might be described as ‘how things get done around here.’
Because of their long tenure at their institutions, they came to understand the various
stakeholders, the internal processes, the politics, procedures, history, and challenges of
their hospital as an organization.
Practical knowledge gained from past experience also encompassed the handling of
challenging interpersonal situations, for example, the sometimes delicate process of
monitoring and giving performance feedback to a peer. In the conversation that follows
from Case 2, one of the RCAT nurses explains how she knew to correct and coach her
colleagues.
INTERVIEWER: How did you handle the ones where, did you personally know, for
instance, which nurses were not complying?
CRITICAL CARE NURSE, CASE 2: You can see the nurse’s initials, and then we
were not being judgmental, but we would go up to them and ‘Say, you know, it’s the
standard of care now. We’ve made this a standard of care that you do oral care on a
vented patient every two hours. There were four hours that you didn’t chart it. If you
didn’t chart it, it’s not [done].’ ‘Well, I did it.’ ‘Well, it’s not done.’ Then you just
tell them. They’re pretty, like anybody else, they take it well. If you say it in a right
tone of voice, they take it well.
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ICU LEAD NURSE: These are people we work with. These are our friends, so you
don’t want to come at them judgmentally… We say, ‘You know what?’
Some aspects of practical knowledge used to make the project successful were more
mundane. For example, in Case 3:
NURSE MANAGER, CASE 3: We tried so many different things… The isolation
equipment… seemed like such a small thing, but… that contributed to noncompli-
ance sometimes because the staff was saying, oh gosh, I’m miserable in that. We had
to go back and look at different gowns.
Clinical data
We found extensive use of data in these cases, primarily in the form of data on infection,
resistance, and antibiotic utilization rates and the ﬁnancial impact of the problem.
4 Most of
these data were ‘locally produced,’ and use of these data was prominent in each of the three
cases. In Case 3, it was internal hospital data that showed a problematic trend in their
multi-drug resistant organism numbers:
PHYSICIAN CHAMPION, CASE 3: And then as we saw our rates climb into 25%
resistant organisms, and we saw pitch rates begin to climb to 35% to 40%, we began
to realize that it’s coming, and it was coming fast.
The champions used internal data to persuade their organizations to act and obtain
support from key internal stakeholders as well.
INFECTIOUS DISEASE/CRITICAL CARE PHARMACIST, CASE 1: Again, when
we just present to them, here’s what we’ve been doing over the last several years to
try to inﬂuence resistance rates, show them the numbers continue to get worse. We
developed data in terms of how much drugs we were actually using… So we had
gone back and pulled all the data to ﬁnd daily doses, and we had those numbers. We
could show them that [despite the] restrictions, they actually were still going up. It
was easy to point to the quinolones and say, here’s all the other drugs down here.
Here’s the quinolones up here, and there were times when we were literally using
twice as much ﬂuoroquinolone as all the other major classes of drugs put together.
Case 2 provided a unique example of how what might be called ‘naturally occurring
data’ helped the nursing staff see the effectiveness of a new endotracheal tube, which they
had adopted as part of their approach to eliminating VAP, in removing secretions:
RESPIRATORY THERAPIST, CASE 2: We had several RN’s up in ICU that didn’t
buy into it… I think what ﬁnally got them to buy into it was… actually seeing these
nasty secretions continuously coming through the line. I really think it opened
everybody’s eyes to go, ‘I cannot believe there is that much down there.’
Local data were used as a ‘key indicator’ to monitor progress and provide valuable
feedback to project leaders. In two of the cases, this information was shared with those
4 That these data were used is not in itself a ﬁnding—our case criteria mandated that pre- and post-outcome
measures be available to provide evidence that these were successful projects. Instead, our ﬁndings relate to
how the data were used and the importance the actors ascribed to having the data available.
A study of successful change 505
123charged with implementing the changes in order to make the beneﬁts of the changes more
observable.
In each case, the practice changes were generally implemented in a stepwise, iterative
manner and were driven by data. The process of implementation stretched out over a year
or more. It was an ongoing process of experimentation to see what worked in their hospital.
For example, from Case 1:
INFECTIOUS DISEASE/CRITICAL CARE PHARMACIST, CASE 1: We ﬁnally
just came together one month in this committee, after the course of a couple months
and several different meetings, and said, you know what, it’s time to really address
the ﬂuoroquinolone issue. We’ve got to do something about this if we hope to ever
make a signiﬁcant dent in the resistance problems. And since we’ve tried all these
other things, what we’re really down to is a serious, pretty draconian restriction of
the ﬂuoroquinolones. We just arrived at the point where we tried everything else and
that was the only thing that was really left to us. So we discussed the logistical issues
of doing that. We knew that it was going to be hard. We knew that it would require a
lot of manpower to do that. We knew that it would not necessarily save us money if
we restricted the quinolones because they were relatively inexpensive drugs. If we
tell them we can’t use a quinolone, what else are they going to use, and whatever that
alternative is may be more expensive than the quinolone, so we knew it might cost us
some money in the long run. But the bottom line was, we’ve got a resistance problem
that’s so out of control. We’ve got to impact that somehow. We’ve tried everything
else. This is what’s left, and so that’s when, again after discussions within the
antibiotic subcommittee, ﬁnally we decided that’s what we need to do.
Sources of K&I and linkages
A wide variety of K&I sources and linkage strategies were used. Many linkages were pre-
existing. At the beginning of their projects, several actors had established communication
linkages with information sources that would later be incorporated into the knowledge
network for this project. These networks linked the actors to sources of ideas, information
and options for improving care. Actors in these cases drew extensively on previously
established relationships with various sources of information. Some of these linkages had a
more formal, structured character. For example, presentations delivered at regularly
attended professional meetings were a route by which scientiﬁc information ﬂowed to
actors. Regular reading and targeted searches for articles published in professional journals
were another commonly identiﬁed means for obtaining relevant information. In Case 2, the
Infection Control Professional obtained from the literature the CDC’s newest criteria for
VAP infection. This was a key input into the project that was used not only to standardize
data collection internally but also to facilitate comparisons between their numbers with
other facilities.
In other instances, pre-existing linkages were used for more informal communication.
For example, in Case 3, the physician champion described using his collegial network to
help plan their project:
PHYSICIAN CHAMPION, CASE 3: And I know those people, and I know the
people at [State College] because I did my residency through their program. So we
just get on the phone and start calling and saying this is a problem we’re running
into, what are you all doing about it, and just made lists, and then came back, and
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how they’re approaching it, and what do we think we could away with.
In Case 2, the ICP had previously established connections with national experts that she
had come to know through her leadership activity in the APIC. This network was an
important link to experts in the infection control area, yielding information that was not
only highly relevant but also timely:
INFECTION CONTROL PROFESSIONAL CHAMPION, CASE 2: Well, [a
nationally known expert on infection control], of course… she’s come to our
meetings every year. I actually was the one that asked her to talk about pneumonia,
and so whenever we had questions about it, I just called her up and got some advice.
‘How would you do this?’
These relationships gave her access to information that helped her apply information
already in the public domain. They also gave her access to information that was not yet
widely available:
INFECTION CONTROL CHAMPION, CASE 2: Other people then, people that
have written the guidelines, now we get to know them and just e-mail them and say,
what are you doing in this? [It’s not addressed] in the guideline, so how are you
managing it?
Existing linkages were not always sufﬁcient to meet the K&I needs of project teams and
new relationships had to be cultivated. For example, while attending a regional APIC
meeting, the infection control professional from Case 3 had the opportunity to hear a
nationally-known expert on infection control speak and learned that he was leading a
collaborative effort to pool resources and data in her region. Afterward, she sought him out
for a one-on-one conversation. She told this expert she thought she could make an impact
in her hospital and the community it serves, and, she said:
INFECTION CONTROL CHAMPION, CASE 3: ‘I want you to help me.’ And he
gave me some very clear guidance, things he suggested, things to say to the phy-
sicians. It was a wonderful 30-minute conversation about what it took.
Most of the key linkages were developed for the purpose of innovation. Of these, some
were established to facilitate learning and change generally; others were speciﬁc to the
current project. However, some linkages were developed primarily to serve some other
purpose or no speciﬁc purpose at all.
PHYSICIAN CHAMPION, CASE 3: And it just so happens that the person who is
now in charge of infection disease for the State Health Department was the physician
who helped train me when I was a medical student at [State College].
Continuing education activities in the form of seminars, presentations, and conferences
played an important role, both directly and indirectly. In Case 3, for example, the infection
control champion learned about the regional program that would later become a critical
source of information during a presentation at a regional APIC meeting. Vital information
on a strict but effective hand hygiene policy at another hospital, which in Case 3 was
described as the piece of the puzzle that ﬁnally provided the breakthrough they were
looking for, was obtained rather serendipitously from a didactic presentation. Similarly, in
Case 2, while attending a society meeting the ICU Medical Director learned about
improvements made in a new type of endotracheal tube that was eventually adopted and
A study of successful change 507
123was identiﬁed as the breakthrough that ﬁnally brought the VAP rate to zero. Another
example that illustrates the role of ongoing participation in CME activities was that the
attendance at annual seminars led to development of linkages between the physician
champion in Case 3 and expert resources:
PHYSICIAN CHAMPION, CASE 3:… I had communication with the infectious
doctors at all of the universities, and partly we know them, and we go to seminars
with them. I go to the infection disease seminar every year that’s held by [State
College].
Typically, the linkages with information sources were provided by members of the
project team. An interesting exception was reported in Case 3. A surgeon, who was not a
member of the project team, was considered critical in obtaining physician approval of the
changes being proposed to reduce MSRA. From a variety of sources, he had become aware
of the emergence and growing prevalence of MRSA. When asked where he learned about
the MRSA problem he cited the state chapter of the American College of Surgeons and
professional journals.
SURGEON CHAMPION, CASE 3: As you read and study, and you got to meetings
and so forth, you become aware of this, you know, that MRSA, you start hearing
[about] MRSA.
Through his participation in state meetings, he had heard of an operating room in
Pennsylvania that had been shut down because of MRSA. He described this as the signal
event that convinced him the changes being proposed in his hospital must be approved and
he used this information to persuade his physician colleagues to support the changes during
a meeting that was widely described as ‘the turning point’ in the approval process.
Discussion
This study consisted of an empirical investigation of three instances of successful change
in clinical practice in the domain of antimicrobial resistance in the hospital setting. This
narrow focus makes it impossible to generalize our ﬁndings to a larger population of cases.
In the discussion that follows, we seek instead to generalize our results to selected points in
current theory and research on facilitating change in clinical practice.
Actors and organization
In each case multiple actors were involved in the change process. At the core was a
multidisciplinary project team supported by, and frequently overlapping with multiple
champions. That we found multidisciplinary teams at the core of these successful projects
and multiple champions is concordant with research ﬁndings in the practice change lit-
erature. The importance of champions is well-established in the diffusion of innovation
literature (e.g., Rogers 2003), and the importance of a physician champion to successful
change in the medical setting is widely accepted. In addition, multidisciplinary teams at the
local level have been found to have an important role ‘‘in shaping or ‘mediating’ the ﬂow
of knowledge into practice’’ (Ferlie et al. 2000, p. 101).
Projects were initiated by project team members and champions who were mid-level in
their organizations. This reﬂects what has been called a middle-up-down approach to
change (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), as opposed to a bottom-up or top-down model. These
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changes they believed were important to make. Teams were largely self-directing: project
teams assumed primary responsibility for initiating, planning, obtaining approval for,
implementing, and evaluating practice changes, although in one case these functions were
divided between two teams. The teams analyzed and framed the problems to be addressed,
marshaled evidence to support the need for and direction of change, developed proposals,
and secured approval from internal stakeholders. They oversaw implementation, monitored
progress, and solved problems as they arose.
Project teams were linked through their members to individuals and groups, both within
and outside of their organizations, who served as sources of knowledge and information
that were used in the change process. Teams organized themselves to take advantage of
these multiple sources, bringing the K&I obtained from them into the innovation arena
where it could be evaluated in light of project needs and incorporated as appropriate.
Teams were characterized as collaborations in which hierarchy and roles were down-
played, creating environments in which team members felt a high degree of freedom to
share their knowledge and ideas, a factor that has previously been shown to positively
inﬂuence team learning (Edmondson 2003).
We found it noteworthy that although physician champions were identiﬁed in each case,
they were neither the sole nor always the primary change agents. A physician was iden-
tiﬁable as a primary champion only in Case 1. This ﬁnding may be due in part to a
distinction that can be made between antibiotic management (Case 1), which in our
experience is typically a physician-led function in hospitals, and infection control (Cases 2
and 3), which is usually a nursing-led function.
Multiple sources/multiple linkages
The project teams we studied made use of multiple and varied sources of knowledge and
information in the process of making changes in their clinical practice. The research
community was an important source of K&I, both directly and indirectly. However, it was
but one of several sources that were identiﬁed as important to the success of the projects.
Of particular interest was the number of interpersonal connections to colleagues, experts,
coworkers, and others that served as conduits through which key bits of K&I were
acquired. The picture that emerges is that of a social network that was mobilized, inten-
siﬁed, and elaborated to serve the speciﬁc purposes of the innovations the teams were
working on, a phenomenon that Engel (1997) observed in the agricultural sector.
We were struck by the importance to the innovation process of social networks that
were already in place at the time the projects had begun. These were relationships between
team members and coworkers in their organizations, friends they met during residency
training, experts recruited as presenters at professional meetings, colleagues at other
hospitals, and the like. Existing relationships with professional societies and government
agencies offering continuing education were also important. To the extent that these
relationships crossed intra- and extra-organizational lines, they may be characterized as
boundary spanning, which has been found to be important to the innovation process (Ferlie
et al. 2000, p. 101). There is considerable evidence that such linkages promote innovation
(Greenhalgh et al. 2005) and this was borne out by the cases we studied.
When existing networks could not deliver the K&I needed, new networks were culti-
vated, often opportunistically and aggressively. The key actors in these cases were thor-
oughly engaged in an active pursuit to solve the problem they had chosen to work on and
they seemed to be in an ongoing state of alert for new K&I that could advance their efforts.
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yielded useful K&I were deliberately engaged. We observed a degree of chance and
serendipity as well. Some important bits of K&I came at times and from sources that were
unanticipated by the project teams. They were more ‘discovered’ than ‘acquired,’ sug-
gesting that there is a certain amount of randomness or chance that can enter the change
process.
The richness of the networks of interpersonal relationships available to project teams
was likely facilitated by their multidisciplinarity. This is especially true with regard to
those individuals who served as boundary spanners, linking the project team to resources
outside of the hospital. Diversity in team membership gave project teams a rich network
for exchanging information, both internally and externally.
Knowledge and information used
Scientiﬁc knowledge and evidence played an important role in the innovation process,
providing insight into the causes of problems, suggesting strategies in the form of evi-
dence-based practices or practice guidelines for addressing the problem, and legitimizing
recommendations for speciﬁc practice changes. We found some evidence of adaptation of
practice guidelines, lending support to Dopson and Fitzgerald’s (2005) observation that
practitioners often adapt evidence-based practices as they enact them within their work
settings. However, scientiﬁc knowledge and evidence-based practices account for only
some of the K&I identiﬁed as essential to the success of these projects.
The dominant theory of professional practice holds that ‘‘professional activity consists
in instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientiﬁc knowledge
and technique’’ (Scho ¨n 1983, p. 21). This theory has been challenged by studies of dif-
fusion of innovations showing that formal scientiﬁc evidence is not the sole source of
action; instead, diffusion is described as a complex interplay of explicit evidence and
practical knowledge, gained from professional experience (Dopson and Fitzgerald 2005).
Our ﬁndings support this view at the level of team learning as well. The distinction we
wish to make is one that Ryle (1949) described as ‘‘knowing that’’ versus ‘‘knowing how.’’
It is one thing to know that the evidence shows that improving hand hygiene reduces the
transmission of infection but obviously quite another to know how to get a hospital staff to
wash their hands more frequently. To know the details of a policy that another hospital
implemented to make signiﬁcant improvements in its hand hygiene rates is not the same as
knowing how to successfully enact that policy in one’s own setting.
When it came to the ‘knowing how’ aspect of practice change, the project teams made
extensive use of their own and others’ practical knowledge. An especially salient
dimension of relevant practical knowledge was related to the length of time champions and
other key actors had been members of their organizations. By contrast, practical knowledge
borne of experience working within teams generally or within the project team speciﬁcally
was not consistently mentioned as important. This ﬁnding suggests that under some cir-
cumstances, of the three levels of experience related to increased team learning (Reagans
et al. 2005) experience with the organization may be more important than experience at the
team level.
At key points in the process, locally-produced data or what might be called ‘practice-
based evidence’ (PBE) served an important function. Project teams typically described
their PBE as being both essential and highly effective for convincing stakeholders of the
need to act and also for tracking and monitoring improvement; and, local data were a
critical element of team learning process, a point we will return to later.
510 C. A. Olson et al.
123One way to appreciate the importance of these locally-produced data is to reﬂect on how
these projects began. Given the enormous investment in guideline development and ini-
tiatives by government agencies, professional societies, academic medical centers and
other third parties to promote change in clinical practice, it was of interest to us that none
of the key actors attributed the start of their projects to a planned effort by external
stakeholders to stimulate change. Instead, these projects began with clinical problem or an
opportunity: the worsening of Pseudomonas aeruginosa resistance rates, recognition that
MRSA was the predominant problem pathogen in the hospital and was a growing problem
nationally, discovering that other ICUs had reduced their VAP rates to zero. They were not
driven by ‘‘a decision by an individual or group that a new treatment should be dissemi-
nated in their organization’’ (Rosenheck 2001) or a perceived gap between a practice
guideline and the existing clinical care process. None was undertaken as the result of a
formal, organized initiative. Instead, they originated in an observed gap between desired
and actual clinical outcomes at the level of the patient in two cases and resistance rates in
the other. These were problems that health care professionals discovered, analyzed, and
framed using a combination of locally-produced data, benchmark data from other sources,
the scientiﬁc literature, and their own powers of reason. These were problems in search of
solutions, not solutions in search of willing adopters. We ﬁnd an intriguing parallel here
with the ﬁndings of the physician learning and change study (Fox et al. 1989), Slotnick’s
(1999) research on physician learning, and research on adults’ self-directed learning
projects (Tough 1979), all of which describe a learning process that begins when an
individual confronts a problem that he or she is motivated to do something about. The
problem-oriented origins of these projects provides an interesting commentary on Ferlie
et al.’s (2000, p. 101) suggestion that ‘‘Searches for discrete change levers may be less
productive than identifying local contexts that are ripe for evidence-based change.’’
Practice change as team learning
In our introduction, we linked learning with change in practice. This study sheds light on
some of the dynamics that connect the two. The dominant image that emerged from our
informants’ descriptions of their projects is that of ‘learning-in-practice.’ The change
processes described to us were highly active and experimental in nature. A characteristic of
all three cases was that key actors appeared to be continuously monitoring their envi-
ronments for information and other resources that might support their efforts. To achieve
change, these project teams engaged in a process of experiential learning that was con-
tinuous, stepwise, active, problem-oriented, and focused on a measurable outcome. From
this perspective, the critical role that the ongoing production of practice-based evidence
(i.e., outcome measures) is highly visible.
Learning through the use of practice-based evidence was at the core of the innovation
process. It required repeated cycles of strategizing, implementing, assessing the results, and
reﬂecting back on the process to see where additional changes might be needed. The
processes described to us bore similarities to constructs such as the Plan-Do-Study-Act
cycle associated with quality improvement and the IHI model (Institute for Healthcare
Improvement 2003), Kolb’s experiential learning model (Kolb and Fry 1975), or action
research (Coghlan and Brannick 2004). On this point our study validates Brown and
Duguid’s observation that practice change often takes the form of ‘‘experiments that are
simultaneously informed and checked by experience’’ (Brown and Duguid 1991, p. 50) and
lends support to the central role given to outcomes measurement in the IHI’s model for
improving clinical practice (Institute for Healthcare Improvement 2003).
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and evidence-based practice secondary to their practice-based evidence, with the result that
the latter became the primary driver in the practice change process. The project teams we
studied were empiricists in that they relied on experimentation and observation. The sci-
entiﬁc evidence and the practices derived from it were, it might be said, a source of ideas
about what changes in practice might make a difference, but their process was ultimately
governed by the result of their experiments, whether or not the changes they had imple-
mented ‘moved the needle on the dial’ (i.e., led to improvements in their measured out-
comes). This eclipse of scientiﬁc evidence by practice-based evidence as the primary
driver of practice change poses a challenge to models of change that place scientiﬁc
research at the center of its universe, showing the limits of such a view in accounting for
the full range of processes by which innovation takes place in hospitals. Science clearly
plays a crucial role, but as an explanatory concept it has limited value when it comes to
understanding how these teams went about improving their practice.
Another major theme that emerged across cases was the highly synthetic and sometimes
improvisational process by which project teams developed, tested, and reﬁned a solution to
their clinical problem. As we searched for a word or metaphor to describe how the teams at
the core of these cases acquired and used knowledge and information we arrived at bri-
colage, which we deﬁne as the ability to ‘‘make do with whatever is to hand’’ (Levi-Strauss
1974, p. 17). As the teams involved in these cases moved through the process they acted as
bricoleurs, piecing together a solution using bits of K&I gleaned from several sources or
manufactured in-house. The teams at the core of each project were, in effect, the ‘intel-
lectual workshops’ in which knowledge, information and data were forged into solutions.
Conclusions
There is a growing body of evidence that teams can be effective agents of change in
practice. This study provides some additional insight into how teams go about producing
change, the learning activities that teams engage in and how they use knowledge, infor-
mation, and data in the process. The project teams we studied were not passive receptors of
knowledge and information but were actively engaged in seeking out, creating, synthe-
sizing and deploying multiple forms of knowledge and information from a variety of
sources. This dimension of the innovation process is not well-accounted for by approaches
to change that make a sharp distinction between producers of knowledge (researchers) and
users of knowledge (practitioners) and treat knowledge as a commodity. By their focus on
the production, packaging, dissemination, and utilization of scientiﬁc knowledge, they tend
to blind us to the multiple forms and sources of knowledge and information utilized in the
innovation process, and obscure the challenges actors confront when they attempt to apply
K&I in their own practice.
This study suggests that the underlying intellectual ground pattern of at least some
instances of practice change can be understood as an iterative learning process. This stands
in stark contrast with more linear models tracing the movement of scientiﬁc knowledge
from researchers to practitioners. We believe it also shows the value of using a broader
understanding of what counts as knowledge in the context of innovation in clinical practice
and draws attention to teams not only as consumers but also as sources and producers of
relevant knowledge and information.
Some instances of practice change grow out of a process that highly social. They simply
cannot be well-accounted for by focusing on an individual. It also highlights the potential
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across organizations.
The current study demonstrates the limitations of current approaches to assessing the
impact, effectiveness, or value of CE activities. A comprehensive account of the impact of
CME on clinical practice requires two perspectives. The ﬁrst is what might be called an
activity-based strategy that examines the impact of an educational intervention on practice.
This is currently the dominant model in CME evaluation and research. Given that some
practice change is the result of an ongoing, iterative, synthetic, and to some degree,
serendipitous process and that not all changes have as their proximal cause an educational
activity, studies of this sort are highly likely to underestimate the impact on practice. A
fuller understanding requires a second, complementary approach, which we will call a
change-based strategy that examines how CME activities contributed to practice change
when change is found to occur. This turns the problem on its head by asking not does
change occur as a result of an educational intervention, but instead when change does
occur, what was the contribution that continuing education activities made? These cases
demonstrate that although CME activities may not be the primary or proximal cause of
change in practice, they may nonetheless make critically important contributions, directly
or indirectly, to the innovation process. This ﬁnding suggests that prior investigations into
the impact of continuing education have tended to overlook or perhaps under-appreciate
some of the ways CE can contribute to innovation, both as a source of relevant information
and as a mechanism for developing the knowledge networks needed to support current and
future change initiatives. This phenomenon might be attributed in part to a view of
continuing education programs as primary tools for producing short-term changes in
clinical practice, a view that often leads to the conclusion that CE is not often very
effective. Our study suggests an alternative perspective: continuing education as one
dimension of the knowledge and information ecology (Malhotra 2002) that supports efforts
to improve practice. Effectiveness of a CE program in this context would be based more on
criteria such as timeliness, accessibility, relevance, and utility of the information provided
in relation to the practice change goals of participants, the contribution made to partici-
pants’ readiness to attempt to make a change, or the enrichment of social networks that can
support current or future efforts at change.
Further studies examining the types and sources of knowledge and information used in
the innovation process will enhance our understanding of how continuing education might
support innovation more effectively. The dissemination of information and creation and
recreation of knowledge are at the heart of the CE enterprise; accordingly, CE theory and
practice will beneﬁt from a better understanding of how knowledge and information are
acquired, interpreted, and reconstructed by actors in health care settings to effect change.
Additional research is also needed on how to facilitate the process by which teams learn
and transform this knowledge and information into practical ‘know how,’ the optimal
personnel conﬁgurations for collecting and using the relevant information, and, given the
central role learning can play in the innovation process, the role of continuing education in
fostering innovation and improvements in patient care.
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